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Abstract 
 
We consider fixed load power market with non-convexities originating from start-up and no-
load costs of generators. The convex hull (minimal uplift) pricing method results in power prices 
minimizing the total uplift payments to generators, which compensate their potential profits lost by 
accepting centralized dispatch solution, treating as foregone all opportunities to supply any other 
output volume allowed by generator internal constraints. For each generator we define a set of 
output volumes, which are economically and technologically feasible in the absence of centralized 
dispatch, and propose to exclude output volumes outside the set from lost profit calculations. New 
pricing method results in generally different set of market prices and lower (or equal) total uplift 
payment compared to convex hull pricing algorithm. 
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non-convexities 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Liberalization of power sectors paved the way to development of electricity 
markets with free pricing for power, which can be either centrally coordinated or 
decentralized, e.g. based on bilateral trade. The centrally coordinated electricity 
markets are often based on security-constrained commitment and economic dispatch 
optimization models, which are reduced to the least cost commitment and dispatch 
models for power systems with fixed load, i.e. perfectly inelastic demand. If the 
centralized dispatch optimization problem is convex, then there exists equilibrium 
price (not necessarily unique) that supports the solution: given the price no market 
player, acting as price-taker, has economic incentives to distort its 
output/consumption volumes. The equilibrium price, if it exists, can be obtained by 
means of Walrasian auction, where each market player submits its supply/demand 
volumes at every possible price and the market price is then set so that the total 
demand equals the total supply. Given the consumer/producer benefit/cost functions, 
the total supply/demand volumes at a given price is determined using decentralized 
dispatch problem, obtained by Lagrangian relaxation of power balance constraint in 
centralized dispatch problem.  
For given fixed unit commitment statuses marginal pricing method for convex 
centralized dispatch problems [1]–[3] provides equilibrium price (set of prices), which 
ensure (short-term) stability of the market outcome, i.e. no generator/consumer has 
economic incentives to change its output/consumption volumes set by the centralized 
dispatch. In uninode one-period power market with convex centralized dispatch 
problem that price (set of prices) is given by intersection of aggregate supply and 
aggregate demand curves. However, the marginal price doesn’t reflect non-convex 
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features of power output, such as non-zero minimal capacity limits, fixed costs (such 
as start-up and no-load costs), as well as other sources of non-convexities, and may 
not compensate full cost of power output, so that other pricing mechanisms are 
needed to ensure both economic stability of centralized dispatch outcome and 
nonconfiscatory market pricing for power (for example, side-payments to generators). 
If unit commitment problem is incorporated in the centralized dispatch 
problem, then due to integral nature of commitment decisions and abovementioned 
non-convex aspects of power output the marginal price may fail to be equilibrium 
market price, moreover, equilibrium market price may not even exist (for example, 
due to absence of a price, which supports market outcome) and other mechanisms are 
needed to ensure stability of centralized dispatch solution.  
Different pricing schemes had been proposed for markets with non-convexities 
[4]-[18] including introduction of new products/services (and associated prices) in 
addition to electric power, utilization of nonlinear pricing methodology (with 
generator revenues being nonlinear functions of power output), application of uniform 
(linear) pricing for power with applicable uplifts (side-payments). 
 Convex hull pricing, developed in [4], [5], and [9], stays within linear pricing 
framework with uplift payments (which are generally nonlinear functions of 
output/consumption) introduced to ensure stability of centralized dispatch solution. It 
is assumed that each market player has an opportunity to supply/consume any power 
volume satisfying its internal constraints. In this framework each market player is 
compensated the profit lost due to following the centralized dispatch solution. Market 
player lost profit is calculated as the difference between profit inferred from 
individual market player decentralized dispatch solution and its profit in centralized 
dispatch solutions at a given market price. The total lost profit (and hence, the total 
uplift needed to stabilize the centralized dispatch) equals the duality gap emerging 
after Lagrange relaxation procedure is applied to power balance constraint [4], [5], 
[9]. The convex hull pricing method produces prices, which minimize total uplift 
payment needed to compensate market players for these foregone opportunities.  
The uplift allocation may results in confiscation on supply/demand sides 
and/or distortion of market player bids. The latter may take place, if uplift charges are 
allocated among producers/consumers in a way, reducing/inflating their revenues/ 
expenses but preventing confiscation. In that case producers have economic incentives 
to inflate power output costs in their bids, while consumers are motivated to indicate 
reduced benefit from power consumption (provided that output/consumption volumes 
cleared by the market are unchanged) to show close to zero profit obtained at the 
market and avoid uplift charge allocation. Also, large uplift payments may result in 
market power abuse by market players. Moreover, uplifts decrease transparency of the 
market pricing and suppress economic signals. Therefore, it is all-important to reduce 
total uplift payment needed to support the centralized dispatch solution. 
An approach to achieve that based on introduction of additional redundant 
constraint and associated price was proposed in [19]. The resulting uplift is reduced 
compared to [9] at the expense of having new service (a unit being in a state “ON”) 
and associated price introduced at the market. The redundant nature of extended 
constraint set indicates that the feasible sets of the primal problems specified by 
original constraint set and extended constraint set are identical. The need to introduce 
additional service and associated price stems from the fact that the newly introduced 
constraint depends on optimization variables relating to more than one generator, 
which leads to a need to introduce the associated price in the Lagrange relaxation 
procedure. Also, since the new constraint has the form of inequality, the total uplift 
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payment is not equal the duality gap, hence minimizing total uplift payment is not 
equivalent to solving the corresponding dual problem. 
In the present paper we consider the total uplift reduction problem within 
linear pricing framework with electric power being the only traded commodity, i.e. no 
extra products/services and associated prices are introduced. Each of the additionally 
introduced redundant constraints depends on an output of one generator only, hence it 
could be treated as internal generator constraint without a need to introduce the 
associated Lagrange multiplier in the dual problem formulation. Our proposal, based 
on analyses of market player opportunities foregone by accepting the centralized 
dispatch solution, excludes some uplift payments to market players, which we regard 
as excessive, and thus reduces (or leaves unchanged) total uplift needed to support the 
centralized dispatch solution compared to convex hull pricing algorithm developed in 
[4], [5], [9]. 
For simplicity we consider one-period power market based on uninode power 
system, i.e. power system without transit losses, network and intertemporal (such as 
ramping) constraints. We also assume zero minimal capacity limits of generators.  
The paper is organized as follows. We start with a short review of convex hull 
pricing method in Section II and define a set of opportunities available to generators 
in decentralized power market in Section III. In Section IV we formulate our proposal 
in terms of modified convex hull pricing method, show that in convex case it is 
equivalent to standard marginal pricing, and identify class of power systems for which 
convex hull pricing algorithm and proposed method may result in different sets of 
prices. Structure of the set of prices, produced by modified convex hull pricing 
method, is analyzed in Section V. Section VI contains examples of power systems 
with comparisons of prices and associated total uplift payments resulting from convex 
hull pricing and proposed method. Conclusions are presented in Section VII. 
 
II. Convex hull pricing 
 
Consider a centrally dispatched one-period uninode power market with fixed 
demand d  and n  generating units bidding cost functions )( ii XC , ),( iii xuX  , Ii , 
},...,1{ nI  , n , with output volumes ix  and binary unit state variables iu  each 
taking values in the set }1,0{2 Z  (with 0 for unit in a state “OFF” and 1 for unit in a 
state “ON”). Generator cost functions are assumed to have a structure 
iiiiii uwxcXC  )()(  with fixed cost iw , 0iw , nondecreasing convex continuous 
function )( ii xc  defined for 
max0 ii xx  , Rxi  , where 
max
ix  denotes generator’s 
maximal capacity limit (  max0 ix ), we also have 0)0( ic . The fixed cost 
corresponds either to start-up and/or no-load cost, for simplicity we will refer to it as 
start-up cost. Initially all the units are assumed to be in a state “OFF”. The centralized 
dispatch optimization problem (which we refer to as the primal problem) with 
optimization (decision) variables ),..,( 1 nXXX   takes the form 







Ii
ii
dx
IiGX
X
XC
Ii
i
ii
)(min
,,
,
 , (1) 
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where  is the total cost to meet demand and each iG  denotes a set specified by 
internal constraints of generator i : }0,,|{ max2 iiiiiii xuxRxZuXG 
2
. Internal 
generator constraints specifying sets iG , Ii , and power balance constraint in (1) 
yield the feasible set of the primal problem denoted as  , which is assumed to be 
nonempty and compact. Let ),..,(
**
1
*
nXXX  , ),(
***
iii xuX  , Ii , denote a solution 
to (1).  
To proceed further we state some known mathematical facts about 
optimization problems in question. Given a market price p , decentralized dispatch 
problem for generating unit i  is formulated as 
)]([max)(
,
iii
GX
X
i XCpxp
ii
i


 , (2) 
and defines individual supply curve of the unit. We note that since )(pi  is point-wise 
maximum of a function linear in p , it is convex in p  with well-defined 
subdifferential )(pi . Since Rpdom i )( , which is an open set, )(pi  is also 
continuous on R . Let’s define min.ecix  - minimal economic output as follows: if 
0iw , then 0
min. ecix ; if 0iw , then 
min.ec
ix  is the lowest solution (if any) to 
equation )(/)]([ min.min.min. ecii
ec
i
ec
iii xcxxcw   for 
maxmin.0 i
ec
i xx  ; if there is no 
solution, then maxmin. i
ec
i xx  . (We note that for 
maxmin.0 i
ec
i xx  , 
min.ec
ix  can be 
equivalently defined as the lowest solution to any of 
)(/)]([ min.min.min. ecii
ec
i
ec
iii xcxxcw   and 0}/)]({[
min.min. 
ec
i
ec
iii xxcw , where   
denotes right derivative). Thus, min.ecix  depends on generator’s cost function and 
individual feasible set iG  only. For any given price p  the set of maximizers of (2) has 
output volumes from the set ],[}0{ maxmin. i
ec
i xx . Thus, if start-up cost is nonzero, then 
the supply curve has a gap, as the curve doesn’t have points with output in the range 
),0( min.ecix . The output volumes from that range will never be supplied in 
decentralized dispatch problem under any p . (We note, however, that 
)(),0( min. px i
ec
i   for 
min.min. /)]([ eci
ec
iii xxcwp  ). For example, in case of nonzero 
start-up cost and linear )( ii xc , we have 
maxmin.
i
ec
i xx   and output maximizing (2) equals 
either zero and/or maxix  depending on the value of p , thus output volumes from the 
open interval ),0( maxix  do not maximize (2) at any market price. However, for 
maxmax /)]([ iiii xxcwp   we have ],0[)(
max
ii xp  .  
Optimization over binary variable iu  for given value of ix  allows to exclude 
the binary variable from the problem (2) at the expense of having discontinuities 
introduced in the cost function: 
 )(max)(
];0[
,
max
iii
xx
x
i xfpxp
ii
i


 , (3) 
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with )()()( iiiiii xcxwxf   , ],0[)(
max
iii xxfdom  , and step-function )( ix  defined 
equal to 1 for 0ix  and 0 otherwise. Let’s define )( ii xf  outside )( ii xfdom  
and extend feasible set in (3) to R , then )(pi  is Fenchel convex conjugate of )( ii xf : 
c
ii f . An important property of Fenchel conjugation [20] is that 
c
ii fconvclf )]([
c  , hence )( ii xf  can be replaced by ))(( ii xfconvcl  - the greatest 
closed convex function majorized by )( ii xf , known as closed convex hull of )( ii xf , 
which we denote by )( i
h
i xf . We have ],0[)(
max
ii
h
i xxfdom  , the function )( i
h
i xf  is 
continuous on ),0( maxix , takes infinite values on ),()0,(
max  ix , and is lower 
semi-continuous on R . We note that in general case that replacement results in a 
different set of maximizers for (3). The function )( i
h
i xf  can be formally obtained by 
double Fenchel conjugation of )( ii xf , [20]. Since )(pi  is proper continuous convex 
function on R , application of Fenchel–Moreau theorem yields )()( cc pp ii   , hence 
c))(( i
h
ii xf . Since (3) stays valid if )( ii xf  and feasible set ],0[
max
ix are replaced by 
)( i
h
i xf  and R  respectively, inversion rule for subgradient relations [21] yields 
)()( i
h
iii xfppx   . (4) 
Thus, the set of output-price points of the form ))(,( i
h
ii xfx   can be equivalently 
represented as )),(( ppi . That set of points would be the supply curve for the unit i  
if its cost function were )( i
h
i xf . Eq. (4) implies that we have 









min.min.
min.min.min.
max
min.min.
/)]([...,
/)]([],,0[
/)]([,0
)(
ec
i
ec
iii
ec
i
ec
iii
ec
i
ec
i
ec
iii
i
xxcwp
xxcwpx
xxcwp
p , (5) 
where min.max
ec
ix  is maximal output volume ix  satisfying )(/)]([ iiiiii xcxxcw   for 
max0 ii xx   and the dots denote elements (which may depend on p ) no lower than 
min.
max
ec
ix . We note that if 0
min. ecix , then (5) is well-defined because both 0)0( ic  and 
0max ix  as well as convexity of )( ii xc  imply )0(/)(lim
0
iiii
x
cxxc
i


 , which is finite. 
Now we are ready to formulate dual of the primal optimization problem (1):  


















 




Ii
i
Rp
Ii
ii
Ii
i
IiGX
XRp
D ppdXCxdp
ii
)(max)(minmax
,
,
 . (6) 
As RHS of (6) is unconstrained maximization problem of concave function, its set of 
maximizers, which we denote as P , is given by solutions to 


Ii
i pd )( . It is 
straightforward to see that P  is nonempty and contains nonnegative elements only. 
Since all )(pi  are continuous functions, the objective function in maximization 
problem (6) is also continuous. It follows from (2) that Ii  and p  such that 
))(;/)](max([ maxmaxmax iiiiii xcxxcwp   profit function has a structure 
)()( max pOpxp ii  , where )(pO  denotes terms independent from p . Thus, for 
))(;/)](max([max maxmaxmax iiiiii
Ii
xcxxcwp 

  the objective function in (6) has the form 
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)(max pOxdp
Ii
i 







 and since feasibility of the primal problem (1) entails 



Ii
ixd
max  the following two cases are possible. If 


Ii
ixd
max , then objective 
function in (6) attains its maximal value for any p  from the ray 
))),(;/)](max([max[ maxmaxmax  

iiiiii
Ii
xcxxcw , hence 
P  is nonempty and all of its 
elements are nonnegative. If 


Ii
ixd
max , then objective function in (6) is negative for 
0p , zero at 0p , and negative for p  higher than certain sufficiently large value, 
hence the set of p  with nonnegative values of objective function is bounded and 
contains only nonnegative values of p . That set is also closed as the inverse image of 
closed set ),0[   under the continuous function. Thus, in this case the feasible set of 
(6) can be reduced to a subset with nonnegative values of the objective function, 
which is a compact set. Application of the extreme value theorem ensures that P  is 
nonempty in that case as well. Clearly, in this case all elements of P  are 
nonnegative.  
Let ),(   iii xuX  denotes a maximizer of the problem (2) with 
Pp . The 
duality gap is given by  



Ii
iii
D Xpp )],()([ * , 
Pp , (7) 
and, according to the approach developed in [4], [5], [9], represents sum of generator 
lost profits associated with opportunities to supply power in volumes corresponding to  
),..,( 1

 nXXX  at a price 
Pp  foregone by accepting dispatch *X . Thus, duality 
gap equals the total uplift, and minimizing the total uplift is identical to solving dual 
problem (6). The relation between the total uplift and duality gap stems from the fact 
the relaxed constraint (i.e. power balance constraint) has the form of equality. Since 
),()( *iii Xpp   , Ii , 
 Pp , the duality gap is nonnegative. If either of (1), 
(2), and (6) have multiple optimal points, the duality gap is independent from the 
choice of *X , X , 
Pp .  
The convex hull pricing method instructs to distribute the amount (7) to 
generators as uplift payments to ensure that no generator acting as a price-taker (i.e. 
leaving aside issues related to exercise of market power) has an incentive to change its 
output ),( ** ii xu  given the market price 
Pp . The following two interpretations are 
applicable to the set P . On one hand, (7) entails that the set of prices is chosen in a 
way to minimize the total uplift payment, needed to support the centralized dispatch 
solution, [4]. On the other hand, the set P  can be viewed as subdifferential of the 
convex function D , which is convex hull of total cost function   viewed as function 
of d , [5], [9]. That justifies the terms “minimal uplift pricing” and “convex hull 
pricing” used to describe the method. An important attractive property of the prices 
resulting from convex hull pricing is that they are monotonically increasing in load, 
since subdifferential of convex function is a non-decreasing operator; however, due to 
uplift payments, the aggregate generator revenue is generally not a monotonous 
function of load [5]. 
A price p  is said to support the solution *X , if 
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 )(max arg
,
*
ii
GX
X
i XCpxX
ii
i


, Ii .  
It is straightforward to verify that a price that supports solution to the primal problem 
exists iff the duality gap is zero. In that case the set of prices, supporting solution *X , 
is the same for all *X  (if the primal problem has multiple solutions) and is identical to 
a set of maximizers for dual optimization problem (6). 
The aggregate supply at a given price is a sum of generator outputs obtained 
by solving the corresponding decentralized dispatch problems at that price. The dual 
problem provides a framework to find a market price (set of prices), which 
corresponds to a transition from shortage of aggregate supply compared to demand d  
to surplus of aggregate supply over d . If aggregate supply and demand curves 
intersect at some p , then power balance constraint holds at the intersection segment, 
and X  (some X , if (2) has multiple solutions) belongs to feasible set of the primal 
problem, hence the duality gap is zero. (Here we use the fact that power balance 
constraint relaxed in dual problem formulation has the form of equality. If inequality 
constraint is relaxed and some optimal point of relaxed problem is feasible in primal 
problem, then duality gap could still be present). The converse is also true: if duality 
gap is zero, then p  supports *X  and aggregate supply and demand curves intersect at 
the price p  because *X  satisfies power balance constraint. Therefore, duality gap in 
the model under consideration occurs only if the aggregate supply and demand curves 
don’t intersect. 
Thus, in case of uninode one-period power system under consideration the 
convex hull pricing produces a market price (a set of prices), which corresponds to 
either intersection of aggregate supply and demand curves (no duality gap) or 
transition from undersupply (demand exceeds aggregate supply volume) to 
oversupply (aggregate supply volume exceeds demand).  
Note that (3) provides a straightforward way to find set of prices for one-
period uninode power system resulting from the convex hull pricing method: replace 
generator cost functions )( ii XC  by )( i
h
i xf  in the primal problem, that results in 
convex centralized dispatch problem, and find the corresponding set of marginal 
prices. Graphically, P  corresponds to intersection of demand curve with aggregate 
supply curve of the new problem, constructed from individual supply curves 
));(( ii
h
i xxf  of generators with convex cost functions )( i
h
i xf . 
To illustrate some implications of the convex hull pricing we consider the 
following example. Comprehensive study of important properties of convex hull 
pricing method was presented in [22]. 
 
Example 1. 
Consider power system with fixed demand d  and a single supplier having cost 
function axwuXC )(  with start-up cost w  and constant marginal cost a , zero 
minimal output limit, and maximal output limit maxx , which is assumed to exceed 
demand. Clearly, the primal problem solution yields 1* u , dx * , with marginal 
price a . Supply curve reconstructed from generator’s decentralized dispatch problem 
is comprised of two disjoint segments 0x  for max/ xwap   and maxxx   for
max/ xwap   and is, therefore, discontinuous. We also observe that supply curve 
doesn’t have a point with output equal demand and, hence, supply and demand curves 
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don’t intersect. Also, generator’s output *x  is below 
min.ecx , which equals maxx  in this 
example. 
  Application of convex hull pricing method yields singleton set P  with a price 
max/ xwap  , which is below generator’s average cost for output d . The price 
p  
implies two possibilities for the unit state-output variables: 0u , 0x , and 
1u , maxxx  , both yielding 0),(  Xp . Hence, the generator is compensated 
with uplift payment of )/1(
maxxdw  , which results in zero generator profit for output 
d . We note that if the price were set above 
p , then according to the convex hull 
pricing principle generator would have to be compensated for the foregone 
opportunity to profitably supply maxx , which increases uplift payment. On the other 
hand, generator is not able to supply any non-zero volume other than d , and generator 
had not lost any opportunity to supply any higher output by accepting the centralized 
dispatch solution. Thus, maxx -dependence of the price seems counterintuitive. Also, 
since the price 
p  is below generator average output cost, it may deter new potential 
supply entering the market able to fully replace the incumbent generator because 
p  
underestimates the level of average output cost needed to successfully compete with 
the producer. It seems more desirable to have price independent from infeasible 
output volumes, i.e. volumes above d . That is achieved, for example, when price is 
set to )/( dwa  , in that case no uplift payment is needed at all, if infeasible output 
volumes are removed from lost profit calculation. The reason for maxx -dependence of 
p  is that 
maxmin. xxd ec   and possible way to have closer to d  optimal output in 
dual problem is to reduce 
min.ecx  by lowering maxx . 
The compensation of the lost profit due to foregone opportunities implies that 
the market player could receive that additional profit, if not for the centralized 
dispatch. The example above illustrates that some opportunities, treated as foregone in 
convex hull pricing method, cannot be realized by market players in decentralized 
market and hence opportunities available to generators should be examined in more 
details.  
 
III. Opportunities available to market players 
 
Lost profit compensations associated with foregone opportunities are needed 
to ensure stability of centralized dispatch outcome. That implies that for each 
generator there is number of available legitimate actions it may undertake to distort 
outcome of (1) in order to recover its lost profit. Thus, to calculate the required 
compensation one needs to determine the set of generator output volumes resulting 
from those actions.  
Let’s allow generator 
0i  to engage in bilateral contracts for power with the 
other market participants (both generators and consumers) paying to other generators 
full cost of contracted output volumes according to their bids and receiving payments 
from consumers for the contracted volumes in the amount indicated in their bids. The 
market player bids used in the described procedure are the ones submitted for the 
centrally coordinated market.  Since demand is fixed, we formally require all demand 
volumes to be fully contracted, thus the feasible set of the optimization problem is 
unchanged. We require the resulting output/consumption schedule to be both feasible 
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and attainable as centralized dispatch outcome. In this setting only market participants 
with contracts are allowed to participate in centralized dispatch optimization problem 
using their original bids with volumes restricted by the contracted output/consumption 
volumes (the generator 
0i  submits its bid for a volume equal the netted contracted 
volume, i.e. its contracted output). The total financial effect of generator 
0i  from all 
the contracts should be nonnegative. 
Formally, we say that generator 
0i  has an opportunity to supply output volume 
c
ix 0 , 
max
00
0 i
c
i xx  , if there exist a set of 
c
ix , 
max0 i
c
i xx  , }{\ 0iIi , and a set of 
corresponding ciu , Ii , so that ),..,( 1
c
n
cc XXX  , with ),( ci
c
i
c
i xuX  , satisfies the 
following condition: 





Ii
ii
XX
X
X
c XCX
c
)(minarg
,
,
. (8)  
Thus, the feasible set in (8) is given by that of (1) supplemented by cii uu  , 
c
ii xx  , 
Ii . If 0cix , then 1
c
iu ; if 0
c
ix , then 0
c
iu ; if both 0iw  and 0
c
ix , then we 
have either 0ciu  or 1
c
iu . Clearly, we have 
cX . Let’s denote by c  the set of 
all cX  satisfying (8). Since the generator 
0i  aside from producing output 
c
ix 0  merely 
acts as intermediary (retaining the market surplus), the set c  is independent from the 
choice of 0i . To make a transition from 
c  to a set of possible output volumes for a 
given producer i , let’s denote as сi  a set containing all iX   such that there exist a 
collection of iX , Ii , ii  , so that 
cX  . The set сi  can be viewed as projection 
of c  on the set RZ 2  corresponding to iX  . In general case i
с
i G , 
с
i
Ii
c 

 
but 
с
i
Ii
c 

. We also note that the primal problem outcome can be realized 
through a set of bilateral contracts and, therefore, 
сX * , сiiX 
* .  
Since all cX  are primal feasible, the right-hand side of (8) defines self-
correspondence   with a range c . It follows from (8) that c  is a set of 
fixed points of that correspondence. 
Let’s define as N  all elements X  from   with 0ix , 1iu  at least for one 
i  such that 0iw  (if there are no such elements, then N  is an empty set).  Denote as 
  the set   excluding N , then all elements of   can be realized through a set of 
bilateral contracts: 
Proposition 1: c . 
Proof. Clearly, we have c , so we need to show that c . Let X , 
since the corresponding x  satisfies dx
Ii
i 

 and max0 ii xx  , Ii , we conclude 
that X   satisfies (8) for cX  because XX   is the only feasible point in optimization 
problem (8).  Thus, we have 
c , and hence 
c
. Proposition is proved. 
Proposition 1 allows to find 
с
i0
  explicitly by projecting   on RZ 2 , 
associated with 
0i
X : the corresponding values of output volumes 
c
ix 0  are given by 
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closed interval ],[ maxmin
00
c
i
c
i xx  with )0;(max
00 ,:
maxmin   iiIii i
c
i xdx , 
);(min maxmax
00 i
c
i xdx  . Thus, aside from special cases when either generator zero 
output and/or maximal generator output are infeasible, the set of possible output 
volumes by the generator is identical to that specified by 
iG  (up to a points 
)0,1(  ii xu  for 0iw ) and modified convex hull pricing presented below is 
identical to convex hull pricing approach. 
We note, that if N  is nonempty, then   and, hence, c , are not compact. The 
set 
с
i0
  is noncompact iff both 0
0
iw  and 0
min
0
cix . In that case we have 
}0,1|),{()}0,0{( max
000000
c
iiiii
с
i xxuxu  . That raises a question if maximum 
(minimum) of a continuous function of 
0i
X  exists on 
с
i0
 . Since )}0,1{(
0
сi  is 
compact, then the function continuous on )}0,1{(
0
сi  is guaranteed to have 
extremum on it, and if the extremum is attainable outside the point )0,1(
00
 ii xu , 
then the answer is positive.  
When start-up costs of all units vanish, optimization of the binary state 
variables in primal problem produces convex problem. In this case сi0  becomes a set 
of possible output volumes 
c
ix 0  and equals the closed interval ],[
maxmin
00
c
i
c
i xx .  
 
IV. Modified convex hull pricing 
 
Let’s define modified primal problem  
 







Ii
ii
dx
IiGX
X
XC
Ii
i
ii
)(min)(~
),(
~
,

      (9) 
with 
c
i
c
iX
i
c
iiii XG

 ),()}0,0{()(
~
 , where 
},),(|),{(),( i
c
iiiiiiii
c
ii xxGxuxuX   , (10) 
with some 0>i , ),..,( 1 n  . Inclusion of ),( i
c
ii X   for each element 
c
i
c
iX   is 
needed to indicate in the dual problem whether at a given price generator is willing to 
supply some more/less power than ix
~ , compatible with its internal constraints. Thus, 
for each cix  with 
c
i
c
iX  , sets )(
~
iiG   and iG  have identical output volumes in some 
closed neighborhood of cix  for points in that neighborhood compatible with iG . 
Regarding the need to ensure that )(
~
iiG   includes a point  )0,0(  ii xu  we have the 
following comment. If 
c
i  includes only elements with unit i  having output no lower 
than some positive value, then for sufficiently small i  all elements of 
c
i
c
iX
i
c
ii X

 ),(   
correspond to unit’s state “ON”, and if )0,0(  ii xu  is not included in )(
~
iiG  , then 
in decentralized dispatch problem for a given price the unit will find its optimal output 
volume disregarding the start-up cost iw . Hence, in this case iw  contributes neither to 
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)(
~
P  nor uplift payment for the unit, which may result in negative profit for the 
generator, implying confiscatory pricing. 
By construction we have 
iii GG )(
~
 . Let’s denote by )(
~
  the feasible set of the 
modified primal problem (9). Since )(
~*  cX  and  )(
~
   for any *X  - 
maximizer of the primal problem (1), we conclude that )(~    and both primal and 
modified primal problems have identical sets of maximizers. 
Since we have explicit expression for ci , it is also possible to formulate )(
~
iiG   
explicitly, 0 i : 
 if 0min cix , then for sufficiently small i  such that 
minc
ii x :  
]};min[,1|),{()}0,0{()(
~ maxmaxmin
ii
c
iii
c
iiiiii xxxxuxuG   ; 
 otherwise (i.e. if both 0min cix  and i
c
ix 
min , or if 0min cix ): 
]};min[0,1|),{()}0,0{()(
~ maxmax
ii
c
iiiiiii xxxuxuG   . 
These expressions also illustrate a need to introduce i . Consider decentralized 
dispatch problem for unit i  with feasible set )(
~
iiG   for some fixed market price. If 
0i  and 0
min cix  is optimal unit i  output, then it means that generator either sells 
all output volumes at a price no lower than marginal cost of output or generator makes 
nonnegative profit but sells some part of output volumes below its marginal cost and 
would prefer to decrease its output.  If 0i  and 
maxc
ix  is optimal unit output, then it 
could mean that either generator operates at maximal capacity (i.e. maxmax i
c
i xx  ) and 
will not change its output if the market price increases or the generator will increase 
its output if the price increases. Introduction of 0>i  allows to differentiate between 
these cases. We also note that 0 i  the set )(
~
iiG   is compact, Ii . 
Dual of the modified primal problem has the form 






 


Ii
ii
Rp
D ppd ),(~max)(~  , with ),(max),(
~
)(
~
,
ii
GX
X
ii Xpp
iii
i


 . (11) 
We note that according to (10) the set )(
~
iiG   for a unit with 0iw  may include 
economically infeasible point )0,1(  ii xu . If (10) is modified to exclude that point 
from ),( i
c
ii X   for such a unit, the resulting set )(
~
iiG   becomes noncompact. 
However, since for unit with 0iw  the point )0,1(  ii xu  neither belongs to 
minimizer of (modified) primal problem nor maximizes ),(~ ii p  , inclusion of that 
point in ),( i
c
ii X   affects neither of )(
~  , )(~  D , and ),(~ ii p  . Thus, we conclude 
that such modification of ),( i
c
ii X   doesn’t change the set of market prices obtained 
from (11) or individual generator uplifts. Likewise, the pricing outcomes are not 
affected, if the point )0,0(  ii xu  in definition of )(
~
iiG   is substituted or 
supplemented by )0,1(  ii xu  for generator with 0iw .  
Since each ),(~ ii p   is point-wise maximum of the function linear in p , it is 
convex in p  with well-defined subdifferentials with respect to p , which we denote 
as ),(~ ii p  . Let )(
~
P  be a set of maximizers of (11). It is straightforward to verify 
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that )(
~
P  is nonempty. Clearly, )(
~
P  is a set of prices, which solve 



Ii
ii pd ),(
~  . Relation iii GG )(
~
  implies )(~  DD  . Hence, 
  )(~)(~DD , which entails relation between duality gaps of original and 
modified optimization problems: 
DD   )(~)(~0 . 
Therefore, total uplift needed to support centralized dispatch solution at any price 
)(
~~ Pp  in modified optimization problem (9) is no higher than that for original 
problem (1) at any price 
 Pp . Moreover, if duality gap of the original problem is 
zero, then duality gap of the modified problem is also zero. (The converse is generally 
not true, as it is illustrated in Example 3 below). We propose to calculate the set 
)(
~
P  and lost profits ),(),(~ *iiii Xpp    for )(
~
Pp  in the limit as 0  and 
utilize them as the set of market prices and individual generator uplifts respectively. 
Clearly, the individual uplifts are independent from the choice of )0(
~
 Pp . 
Let's consider the case of no generator start-up costs ( 0iw , Ii ). The 
duality gap is zero as the primal optimization problem becomes convex after 
exclusion of the binary state variables. We prove that in this case the set of prices 
obtained from convex hull pricing method is identical to the set of prices given by 
modified convex hull pricing algorithm. 
Proposition 3: Let for some i  we have both 0iw  and 0i , then a price p  
supports *iX  in decentralized dispatch problem iff it supports solution 
*
iX  in modified 
decentralized dispatch problem: 
   
 )(max arg
,
*
ii
GX
X
i XCpxX
ii
i


    )(max arg
)(
~
,
*
ii
GX
X
i XCpxX
iii
i

 
. 
Proof. Clearly, since iiii GGX  )(
~*  , if p  supports *iX  in decentralized dispatch 
problem, then it supports *iX  in modified decentralized dispatch problem. To prove 
the converse, we note that the binary state variables can be excluded from both  
decentralized dispatch problem and modified decentralized dispatch problem for the 
unit i , - we denote the resulting feasible sets as ig  and )(
~
iig   respectively. Clearly, we 
have }0,|{ maxiiiii xxRxxg   and the generator decentralized dispatch problem 
becomes convex. Let p  supports *ix  in the modified decentralized dispatch problem 
(11) for generator i , then sets )(~ iig   and ig  are identical in the closed i -
neighborhood of *ix  (the i -neighborhood may belong neither to )(
~
iig   nor to ig , but 
both )(~ iig   and ig  have nonempty intersection with the i -neighborhood. If 0
* ix  or 
max*
ii xx  , then 
*
ix  belongs to the boundary of that intersection). Hence, the concave 
function )( ii xcpx   has local maximum at 
*
ix  on a convex set ig . Therefore, it has 
global maximum at *ix  on ig , which entails that p  supports 
*
ix  in the decentralized 
dispatch problem (2). Proposition is proved. 
Hence, if start-up cost of all generators vanish, then the convex hull pricing 
and modified convex hull pricing methods result in identical sets of prices, i.e. 
marginal prices. We notice that the modified convex pricing approach in this case 
13 
 
produces a set of market prices which is independent from i . We also note, that 
Proposition 3 stays valid if *iX  is replaced by 
с
i
c
iX  . 
Now we return to non-convex case and observe that mincix  can be formally set 
to zero in dual of the modified primal problem, i.e. extending )(
~
iiG   to include all the 
elements of iG  with output volumes in the range ],0[
max
i
c
ix   affects neither the set of 
market prices nor the uplift received by each generating unit in modified convex hull 
pricing framework. Define 






 


Ii
ii
Rp
D ppd ),(ˆmax)(ˆ   (12) 
with 
),(max),(ˆ
)(ˆ
,
ii
GX
X
ii Xpp
iii
i


 , },),(|),{()(ˆ
max
i
c
iiiiiiiii xxGxuxuG   . 
Let’s denote by )(ˆ P  the set of maximizers of (12). 
Proposition 4: For optimization problems (11) and (12) with 0i , Ii , we have  
 )(
~
)(ˆ    PP ; 
 ),(~),(ˆ iiii pp   , )(
~
 Pp , Ii ; 
 )(~)(ˆ  DD  .  
Proof. At first we study relation between ),(~ ii p   and ),(ˆ ii p  . If for given i  we 
have i
c
ix 
min , then )(ˆ)(
~
iiii GG    and hence ),(ˆ),(
~
iiii pp   , Rp , therefore 
),(~ ii p   can be replaced by ),(ˆ ii p   in (11) with no effect on )(
~
P  or )(~  D . 
Otherwise, i.e. if i
c
ix 
min , let’s define )(
~
ii xf  as )()(
~
iiii xfxf   for ix  corresponding to 
output volumes in )(
~
iiG   and   otherwise, likewise define )(
ˆ
ii xf  using output 
volumes in )(ˆ iiG  . For 0ix  and  ii
c
i xx 
min  we have )(ˆ)(
~
iiii xfxf  . 
Consider their respective convex hulls )(
~
i
h
i xf  and )(
ˆ
i
h
i xf , which are convex functions 
having finite values on );min(0 maxmax ii
c
ii xxx  . It is straightforward to verify that 
)(ˆ)(
~
i
h
ii
h
i xfxf   for 0ix  and  ii
c
i xx 
min . Thus, )(ˆ)(
~
i
h
ii
h
i xfxf   for 
 ii
c
i xx 
min . Since each ),(ˆ ii p   is point-wise maximum of the function 
linear in p , it is convex in p  with well-defined ),(ˆ ii p   - subdifferentials with 
respect to p . Using  
)}(ˆ),(ˆ|{),(ˆ i
h
ii
h
iiiii xfpxfdomxxp    (13) 
and analogous expression for ),(~ ii p  , we conclude that in the range 
);min( maxmaxmin ii
c
iii
c
i xxxx    sets ),(
~
ii p   and ),(ˆ ii p   have identical 
elements (if any), Rp .  
As (12) is maximization problem of concave function, its set of maximizers 
)(ˆ P  is given by 


Ii
ii pd ),(ˆ  , and hence elements of ),(ˆ ii p   lower than 
minc
ix  (if any) don’t affect the set )(
ˆ P , analogous observation holds for )(
~
P . 
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Thus, when 0i , Ii , solutions to 


Ii
ii pd ),(
~   and 


Ii
ii pd ),(ˆ   are 
identical, therefore, )(
~
)(ˆ    PP .  
If i
c
ix 
min , then the second bullet is trivially satisfied. Thus, we focus on the 
case i
c
ix 
min . The definition of mincix  implies that if ),(
~
ii p   has no elements equal 
or above mincix , then 


Ii
ii pd ),(
~   and )(
~
Pp . Hence, )(
~
 Pp  both sets 
),(~ ii p   and ),(ˆ ii p  , restricted to )];min(,[
maxmaxmin
ii
c
i
c
i xxx  , are nonempty. As 
we have seen above, these sets are equal when limited to 
)];min(,( maxmaxmin ii
c
ii
c
i xxx    with 0i . Therefore, )(
~
 Pp  restrictions of 
),(~ ii p   and ),(ˆ ii p   to )];min(,[
maxmaxmin
ii
c
i
c
i xxx   are nonempty and equal. As 
)(
~
i
h
ii xfpx   and )(
ˆ
i
h
ii xfpx   are concave functions on convex set 
);min(0 maxmax ii
c
ii xxx  , sets ),(
~
ii p   and ),(ˆ ii p   are maximizers of ),(
~
ii p   
and ),(ˆ ii p   respectively. Since )(
ˆ)(
~
i
h
ii
h
i xfxf   for  i
c
i xx
min , we readily 
obtain ),(~),(ˆ iiii pp   , )(
~
 Pp , for the case i
c
ix 
min . 
Statements of the first two bullets trivially imply claim of the third bullet. 
Proposition is proved. 
 Another view on the Proposition 4 is the following. If i
c
ix 
min , then 
)(ˆ)(
~
iiii GG   , ),(ˆ),(
~
iiii pp   , Rp . If );min(0
min.maxmin ec
ii
c
ii
c
i xxx   , 
then since output volumes from the open interval ));min(,0( min.max ecii
c
i xx   never 
maximize either ),(~ ii p   or ),(ˆ ii p   we conclude that ),(ˆ),(
~
iiii pp   , Rp . At 
last, if min.min ecii
c
i xx  , then Proposition 4 implies that values of p , for which 
),(~ ii p   and ),(ˆ ii p   might be different, do not belong to )(
~
)(ˆ    PP . 
Having showed that mincix  can be excluded from consideration in dual of the 
modified primal problem, we turn to cases when maxcix  can be disregarded as well. 
Define },|{ maxmin. ci
ec
i xxIiiI  , },|{
ˆ maxmin. c
i
ec
i xxIiiI  ,  






 


Ii
ii
Ii
i
Rp
D pppd
ˆ
),(ˆ)(max)(  , (14) 
and let )(P  denote a set of maximizers of (14). 
Proposition 5: For optimization problems (12) and (14) for 0i , Ii , we have  
 )(ˆ)(    PP ; 
 ),(ˆ)( iii pp    , )(ˆ 
 Pp , Ii ;  
 )(ˆ)(  DD  .  
Proof. Clearly, if for a given Ii  we have maxmax ii
c
i xx  , then )(
ˆ)( iiii GG    and 
),(ˆ)( iii pp   , Rp , and ),(ˆ ii p   can be replaced by )(pi  in (12) with no effect 
on )(ˆ P  or )(ˆ  D . Thus, we may restrict our consideration to the case of 
maxmax
ii
c
i xx  , Ii . It is straightforward to verify that in that case )(
ˆ)( i
h
ii
h
i xfxf   
for ],( max i
c
ii xx   and, hence, )(
ˆ)( i
h
ii
h
i xfxf   for );(
max
i
c
ii xx  . Using 
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(4) and (13) for Ii  we conclude that in the interval ),( max i
c
ix  , and hence in 
the range ),0[ max i
c
ix  , sets )(pi  and ),(ˆ ii p   have identical elements, Rp . 
 Since (14) is maximization problem of concave objective function, )(P  is 
given by a set of solutions to 


Ii
ii
Ii
i ppd
ˆ
),(ˆ)(  , and hence elements of 
)(pi  higher than 
maxc
ix  (if any) don’t affect the set )(
P . Therefore, for 0i , 
Ii , equations 


Ii
ii
Ii
i ppd
ˆ
),(ˆ)(   and 


Ii
ii pd ),(ˆ   have identical 
sets of solution for p , which entails )(ˆ)(    PP .  
Since elements of ),(ˆ ii p   higher than 
maxc
ix  do not contribute to 



Ii
ii pd ),(ˆ  , (we still consider the case 
maxmax
ii
c
i xx  , Ii ), we conclude that 
)(ˆ  Pp  the set ),(ˆ ii p   has at least one element in the range ],0[
maxc
ii xx  , hence 
)(ˆ  Pp  both ),(ˆ ii p   and )(pi  are nonempty and equal when restricted to that 
range. As both )( i
h
ii xfpx   and )(
ˆ
i
h
ii xfpx   are concave functions on convex set 
i
c
ii xx 
max0 , sets )(pi  and ),(ˆ ii p   are maximizers of )(pi  and ),(ˆ ii p   
respectively. Since )(ˆ)( i
h
ii
h
i xfxf   for ],0[
max
i
c
ii xx  , we conclude that 
)(),(ˆ pp iii   , Ii , )(ˆ 
 Pp , which also entails )(ˆ)(  DD  . Proposition is 
proved.  
Thus, Propositions 4 and 5 imply that for 0i , Ii , we have 
)()(ˆ)(
~
   PPP .  
Since each unit from the set Iˆ  has physical capability to satisfy demand alone 
and exhibits natural monopoly behavior (has decreasing average cost function) for 
output volumes in ],0( d , we will refer to these units as large natural monopoly 
generating units (LNMGUs). Thus, in the absence of LNMGUs, convex hull pricing 
[4], [5], [9] and proposed modified convex hull pricing result in identical sets of 
market prices. These pricing methods may produce different sets of prices only if the 
system has at least one LNMGU. We note that maxmin. ci
ec
i xx   implies dx
ec
i 
min. , which 
entails dxi 
max . Throughout the rest of the paper Ii ˆ  we choose sufficiently small 
i , so that dx
ec
ii 
min.0  . That ensures decreasing average cost function for 
LNMGU output in the range ],0( id  . 
Generally, dual problem (6) is convex, hence P  is convex. Since P  is 
nonempty and contains nonnegative elements only, it has one of the following forms: 
a singleton }{a , a bounded closed interval of the form ],[ ba , a ray ),[ a  with some 
a  and b : Rba , , ba 0 . However, if at least one LNGMU is present in the 
system, then the last possibility is not realized, since for any price no lower than 
average cost of output for its maximal capacity there is excess of supply over demand. 
Therefore, a set P  is bounded in the presence of at least one LNMGU and is either a 
singleton or a bounded closed interval.  
Each LNMGU is able to satisfy demand as dxci 
max , however, on one hand if 
its start-up cost is too high, then it might be economically rational not to operate the 
unit (provided that such a dispatch is feasible), on the other hand inequality 
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maxmin. c
i
ec
i xx   prevents the start-up cost from being too low, which limits the number 
of such units in operating state. Thus, natural question is how many LNMGUs can 
operate simultaneously according to the primal problem solution? We show that the 
answer is that at most one. 
Proposition 6: Any solution to primal problem (1) has no more than one LNMGU 
having nonzero output, i.e. at most one unit with dxeci 
min.  has 1* iu . 
Proof. Assume the contrary: let there be a solution to primal problem (1) with more 
than one operating unit with dxeci 
min. , denote all such units as M . Since )(xci  is 
convex, we have 
)](),([)( iiiiii xcxcxc    for 
max0 ii xx   Ii , (15) 
where 
  denotes left derivative. Let k  be a unit from M  with highest right 
derivative at d : )()( dcdc ki   , Mi . Denote by S  a set of all units with 1
* iu , 
excluding unit k . We have 


}{
*)]([
kSi
iii xcw . Let’s consider the primal problem 
supplemented by additional constraints: 0iu  for Si  (which also imply 0ku ), 
1iu  for Si , and denote by 
  and 
x  the solution and optimal output volumes of 
the new primal problem (if there are multiple maximizers, 
x  denotes any one of 
them). Since by assumption there is at least one more unit with dxi 
max  and 1* iu , 
the new problem is feasible and  . Clearly, we have   , which entails 



Si
ii
Si
i
kSi
ii
kSi
i xcwxcw )()(
}{
*
}{
 . Let’s denote by 
zS  and mS  subsets of S  
containing all units with 0ix  and 
max
ii xx 
  respectively, the rest of units in S  we 
denote by bS , thus we have bmz SSSS  . Therefore, 
 
    


zbm Si
ii
Si
iiii
Si
iiiikkk xcxcxcxcxcxcw )()()()()()(
***max* 
. (16) 
All )( ii xc  are convex functions, therefore 
))(()()( max*maxmax* iiiiiiii xxxcxcxc   , 
** )0()( iiii xcxc  , (17) 
)()()( **  iiiiiii xxaxcxc  , )(

iii xca  . (18) 
Since values of all binary variables in new primal problem are set by constraints, their 
values can be substituted in the objective function and the rest of constraints. The 
resulting new optimization problem is convex, since it has continuous optimization 
variables only, convex objective function, and linear constraints. The latter ensures 
that linearity constraint qualification holds, hence Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions 
imply existence of   such that 
 )(
max
ii xc , mSi ; )0(ic
 , zSi ; )(

ii xc , bSi . (19) 
Inequality dxeck 
min.  and definition of min.eckx  imply )(/)]([ dcddcw kkk  . Hence, 
using (16)-(19) and dx
Si
i 

  we obtain **)()()( kkkkk xxcdcdcd
 . Application 
of ))(()()( ** dxdcdcxc kkkkk    entails 
**)( kkk xxdc
 . Condition dx
ec
k 
min.   
implies 0kw , and 1
* ku  yields 0
* kx . Therefore, 
 )(dck . All units from 
}{\ kM  belong either to 
zS  or to bS , hence for }{\ kMi  we have either 
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)0(ic
  or )(  ii xc . Using )()()0( dcxcc iiii  
  and (15), we conclude 
that )(dci
 , }{\ kMi . The choice of k  implies )(dck
 , which is 
incompatible with  )(dck . Thus, there is no more than one unit with dx
ec
i 
min.  
in a state “ON” according to solution to the primal problem (1). Proposition is proved. 
 Since primal problem (1) and modified primal problem (9) have identical sets 
of solutions and each LNMGU has dxci 
max , statement of Proposition 6 is true for 
modified primal problem (9) as well. Now we raise that question in the context of 
dual problem. Let’s define 
  )}/()(min)/()]([,ˆ|{)(ˆ ˆˆˆˆˆˆmin iiiiIiiiii ddcwddcwIiiI    . 
Proposition 7: If 0ˆ I , then for given sufficiently small positive values of }{ i , Ii ˆ , 
removal of any group of LNMGUs from consideration in the dual problem (14), 
provided that at least one LNMGU from )(ˆmin I  remains,  will not change the set of 
market prices resulting from (14). 
Proof. )( Pp  we have  



Ii
ii
Ii
i ppd
ˆ
),(ˆ)(  .  (20) 
For sufficiently small 0i , Ii ˆ , application of (4) yields: 









)/()]([,
)/()]([],,0[
)/()]([,0
),(ˆ
iiiii
iiiii
iiii
ii
ddcwpd
ddcwpd
ddcwp
p



 . (21) 
Hence, if for some Ii ˆ  we have )/()]([ iiii ddcwp   , then 
ddp iii   ),(ˆ  and, since all elements of )(pi  are nonnegative, (20) implies
)(Pp . Therefore,   )/()(min ˆˆˆˆˆˆ iiiiIi ddcwp    , )(
 Pp , and all 
LNMGUs with )/()]([ iiii ddcw    above   )/()(min ˆˆˆˆˆˆ iiiiIi ddcw    do not 
contribute to RHS of (20) and can be disregarded in (14) without affecting )(P . 
Also, if there is more than one LNMGU with 
  )/()(min)/()]([ ˆˆˆˆˆˆ iiiiIiiiii ddcwddcw    , 
then all but any one of such LNMGUs can be removed from consideration from (14) 
without affecting the set )(P . Proposition is proved. 
As a collorary we conclude that no LNMGU has positive profit in dual 
problem (14), also all LNMGUs except for any one belonging to )(ˆmin I  (for given 
values of 0i , Ii ˆ ) can be removed from consideration in dual problem (14) 
without affecting the set of market prices )(
~
P  and individual uplifts of all 
generating units. We note that statement of Proposition 7 and the collorary are also 
valid for dual problems (6), (11), (12) with possibly different relevant LNMGUs.  
Thus, if more than one LNMGU is present in the power system, then to 
calculate a set of market prices using modified convex hull pricing for given values of 
}{ i , Ii
ˆ , we may identify LNMGU with the lowest average cost 
)/()]([ iiii ddcw   , (if there is more than one LNMGU which satisfies that 
property, choose any of them), and exclude the rest of LNMGUs from consideration 
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in (14). Note that the set of LNMGUs with the lowest average cost may depend on 
values of }{ i , Ii
ˆ . We also notice that if at least one LNMGU is present in the 
power system, then the price obtained from (14), i.e. any element of )(
~
P  (provided 
that 0i , Ii ), cannot exceed   )/()(minˆ iiiiIi ddcw  
, while any element of 
P  cannot exceed   min.min.
ˆ
/)(min eci
ec
iii
Ii
xxcw 

. Clearly the upper bound for )(
~
P  is 
no lower than that for P . That is compatible with the fact that proposed modified 
convex hull pricing tends to produce higher prices compared to convex hull pricing, 
which is formalized in Proposition 8 below. 
Therefore, at most two LNMGUs are relevant: one for primal problem 
solution for power output and the other for dual problem solution for prices. Also, 
LNMGU in a state “ON” in solution for primal problem (1), which of course is also a 
solution for the modified primal problem (9), and LNMGU setting the price in (14) 
might be different (even if solution to the primal problem is unique), as it is shown in 
the example below. 
 
Example 2 
Consider one-period uninode power system with fixed demand d  and three 
generating units ig , 3,2,1i , with cost functions given by: 0)( 11 XC , 4/0 1 dx  ;
2/)( 222
2
22 xudXC  , dx 20 2  ; 3
2
33 4.1)( udXC  , dx 20 3  . Thus, 1g  and 3g  have 
zero variable cost of output. It is straightforward to verify that 0
min.
1 
ecx , dxec 2min.2  , 
dxec 2min.3  . Therefore units 2g  and 3g  are LNMGUs. The primal problem (1) as well 
as the modified primal problem (9) have unique optimal point with 1g  having output 
4/d , 2g  producing 4/3d , and unit 3g  being in a state “OFF”. Thus, it is LNMGU 2g  
which is “ON” in the unique primal problem solution. Solution of the problem (14) 
will make 1g  produce 4/d  and satisfy the rest of demand with either 2g  or 3g  
depending on which unit has the lowest average total cost for output volumes 2d  
and 3d  respectively: )/()2/)(( 2
2
2
2   ddd  for 2g  and )/(4.1 3
2 dd  for 3g . 
For sufficiently low 2  we have )(5.05.1)/()2/)((
2
222
2
2
2  Odddd  , which 
implies that the average total cost of 3g  is lower, hence 2g  is “OFF” and 3g  sets the 
price equal to its average total cost of output for a supply volume 3d  in solution to 
(14), (since 3g  has zero profit at that price, it can be either in a state “OFF” or “ON” 
according to the solution). 
Regarding outputs of 2g  and 3g  in solution for dual problem (6) we note that 
since unit 2g  has average total cost for output 
min.
2
ecx  equal to d2 , which is above 
average total cost for output dxec 7.0min.3   of unit 3g , the solution of the dual problem 
(6) implies that 2g  is “OFF” while 3g  sets the market price and can be in either state 
with zero profit. 
 
V. Limit of )(
~
P  as 0i  
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Propositions 4, 5, and 7 imply that for 0i , Ii , the set )(
~
P  is 
independent from }{ i , Ii , and hence may depend only on }{ i , Ii
ˆ . Therefore, if 
no LNMGU is present in the power system, then for 0i , Ii , we have 
  PP )(
~
  and )(
~
P  is independent from  . Let’s examine in more detail the 
structure of )(
~
P  for power system having at least one LNGMU. Define reduced 
aggregate supply curve as the aggregate supply curve of all the generating units 
excluding Iˆ , i.e. omitting all LNMGUs. The following three cases are possible.  
First case is when the reduced aggregate supply curve has a point with output 
volume lower than d  at a price   ddcw ii
Ii
/)(min
ˆ


. For any sufficiently small 0i , 
Ii ˆ , we have ddcwddcw iiiiii /)]([)/()]([   , hence any LNMGU from 
)(ˆmin I  becomes marginal in solution for (14) and sets the price. Thus, in this case 
)(
~
P  is a singleton with an element   )/()(min
)(ˆmin
iiii
Ii
ddcw 



, which is given by 
minimum of finite number of functions continuous in 
i , )(
ˆ
min Ii , and, hence, is 
continuous function of i . As 0i  for all Ii
ˆ , the market price increases and 
attains the value of   ddcw ii
Ii
/)(min
ˆ


. 
The second case is realized, when at a price   ddcw ii
Ii
/)(min
ˆ


 minimal 
supply volume on the reduced aggregate supply curve equals d . Here we have two 
possibilities. If for any price below   ddcw ii
Ii
/)(min
ˆ


 all the output volumes on the 
reduced aggregate supply curve are below d , then analysis and conclusion of the first 
case are applicable. Otherwise, for sufficiently small values of 
i , Ii
ˆ , the set 
)(
~
P  is given by bounded closed interval )](,[ ba  with a  being nonnegative real 
number independent from   and   )/()(min)(
)(ˆmin
iiii
Ii
ddcwb 



, which is a 
continuous function of 
i .  As all 0i , )(
~
P  tends to )]0(,[ ba  with 
  ddcwb ii
Ii
/)(min)0(
ˆ


. 
Now we turn to the third case, when at a price   ddcw ii
Ii
/)(min
ˆ


 all the 
points on the reduced aggregate supply curve have output volume higher than d . That 
means that for sufficiently small positive 
i , Ii
ˆ , all LNMGUs are irrelevant in 
dual problem (14) solution for prices and, therefore,   PP )(
~
 . 
Relation between set of market prices resulting from convex hull pricing 
method and proposed modified approach is given below.  
Proposition 8: For )(
~~  Pp  the following holds for sufficiently small 0i , 
Ii : either 
Pp~  or all elements of P  are below p~ . 
Proof. From (20) we deduce 








 
Ii
ii
Ii
i
Ii
ii
Ii
i ppdpp
ˆˆ
),~(ˆ)~(),~(ˆ)~(  , )(
~~  Pp , 
with all left/right derivatives being nonnegative. For sufficiently small 0i , Ii
ˆ , 
(21) entails that if 0),~(ˆ  ii p  , then dp ii  ),
~(ˆ  , hence 0),~(ˆ  ii p  , 
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)(
~~  Pp . For sufficiently small 0i , Rq , Ii
ˆ , using (5) and (21) we 
arrive at both )(),(ˆ qq iii     and )(),(ˆ qq iii    . Therefore,  






 
Ii
i
Ii
i
Ii
i ppdp
ˆ
)~()~()~(  , )(
~~  Pp . 
If for a given )(
~~ Pp  we also have dpp
Ii
i
Ii
i  




ˆ
)~()~(  , then 
Pp~ . If, 
however, dpp
Ii
i
Ii
i >)
~()~( ˆ



   , then 








 
Ii
i
Ii
i
Ii
i
Ii
i ppdpp
ˆˆ
)~()~()()(  , 
 Pp . (22) 
Since 


Ii
i
Ii
i pp
ˆ
)()(   is a convex function and subdifferential of a convex 
function is a monotone operator, (22) entails pp ~ ,  Pp . 
 
VI. Examples 
 
Example 1 revisited. 
Application of the modified convex hull pricing to the Example 1 gives 
singleton set )(
~
P  with the element given by )/()(~   dwap  for 
dx  max0  , clearly 
  pp )(~  . In this case generator receives uplift 
)]/(1[  ddw , which is smaller than uplift implied by the convex hull pricing and is 
zero in the limit as 0 . In both methods the generator being LNMGU receives 
zero profit. We note that, contrary to market price obtained from convex hull pricing, 
the price )(~ p  is decreasing with load. That is a trade-off between lower total uplift 
payment and properties of the market price. 
 
Example 3 
Let’s add to the power system, described in Example 1, another generator with 
zero start-up cost: generator 1g  has cost function 11111)( xauwXC    with 
max
110 xx   and generator 2g  has 222)( xaXC   with 
max
220 xx  . Parameters are 
assumed to satisfy the following relations: 1a  and 2a  are positive constants with 
dwaaxwa // 112
max
111  , 
max
1xd  , 
max
2xd  . These conditions ensure both that 
primal problem (1) has unique solution with 1g  in a state “OFF” with 2g  producing d  
and that dual problem (6) results in market price set by 1g , which is below 2a  - 
marginal cost of output by 2g . Clearly, 1g  is LNMGU, while 2g  is not. Application 
of the convex hull pricing results in singleton set P  with element 
max
111 / xwap 

  
and uplift of dpa )( 2
  paid to 2g .  
Application of the modified convex hull pricing for sufficiently small 01    
results in singleton set ),(
~
21 
P  with element 221 ),(
~ ap   , which implies zero 
total uplift payment since 1g  is not receiving uplift due to )/(),(
~
11121  
 dwap . 
We note that   pp ),(~ 21   and generators 1g  and 2g  have zero profits both in convex 
hull pricing method and modified one. In this example, contrary to convex hull 
pricing method which allows nonoperating generator 1g  to set the price, the new 
21 
 
method results in market price set by generator 2g , which has nonzero output in the 
primal problem (1) solution. That is, however, a specific property of the given 
example and in general case the new method also allows nonoperating generator to set 
the market price. 
 
Example 4 
Let’s amend Example 3 replacing max2xd   by 
max
2xd  . Both primal problem 
(1) solution for outputs and dual problem (6) solution for a set P  as well as each 
generator uplift payment in convex hull pricing method do not change. However, 
outcome of the modified convex pricing changes and for sufficiently small 01   is 
given by bounded closed interval )]/(,[),(
~
111221  
 dwaaP . We note that 
p  is 
below any elements of ),(
~
21 
P . In the limit as 01  , 02  , we have 
]/,[)0,0(
~
112 dwaaP 
  and again zero total uplift. That manifests the fact that at 
a price above dwa /11   generator 1g  has an opportunity to sign profitable contracts 
with all the consumers to supply power volume d  and, hence, if market price were 
set above dwa /11  , then 1g  would have to be compensated for the lost profit.  
 
Example 5 
Let’s modify Example 3 replacing max2xd   by 
max
2xd  . Since 1g  has to be 
“ON” in centralized dispatch problem and 21 aa  , we conclude that 2g  is “OFF” and 
1g  has output equal d  in solution to (1). Due to 2
max
111 / axwa   the convex hull 
pricing method produces unique market price 
max
111 / xwap 

 (the set P  is 
singleton), which implies total uplift )/1(
maxxdw   wholly paid to 1g . Relation 
dwaa /112   implies that for sufficiently small 01   we have )/( 1112  dwaa  
and modified convex pricing algorithm results in unique price 
)/(),(~ 11121  
 dwap , which is higher than 
p . In the limit as 01  , 
02  , no uplift is paid to 1g , while 2g  receives the uplift 
max
2211 )/( xadwa  . It 
is straightforward to verify that modified convex hull pricing gives lower total uplift 
than convex hull pricing method. 
 
VII. Conclusions 
 
We have studied uniform power pricing in one-period uninode power system 
with fixed demand and zero generator minimal capacity limits. Contrary to convex 
hull pricing method, which treats each output volume allowed by generator internal 
constraints as possible even if that output is technologically and/or economically 
infeasible, we propose to identify 
c  - a set of generator output volumes which are 
both technologically and economically feasible. 
c  can be obtained as a set of 
solutions to centralized dispatch problem with generator maximal capacity limits no 
higher than those in the original problem. However, 
c  is not a direct product of 
generator corresponding individual sets. Hence, utilization of 
c  would require 
introduction of new constraints depending of more than one generator output, which 
in turn entails introduction of new products/services and associated prices in Lagrange 
22 
 
relaxation procedure. To stay within single commodity and uniform pricing 
framework, instead of  
c  we propose to consider ci , Ii , which are projections 
of 
c  into individual generator internal feasible sets. That procedure amounts to 
introduction of a set of new redundant constraints each depending on output of one 
generator only. The transition from 
c  to ci  implies a loss of information, since in 
general case 
c  cannot be recovered just from sets ci , that means that introduction 
of new constraints, mixing outputs of different generators, and associated prices may 
potentially reduce total uplift payment even further. When calculating a set of possible 
output volumes we imposed requirement that perfectly inelastic demand should be 
fully contracted, which implies that power balance constraint holds for any element of 
c . Alternative approach, which was not pursued in the present paper, would be to 
replace fixed demand by consumer bids with some benefit functions, e.g. with 
constant marginal benefit, and consider the limit as marginal benefit goes to infinity. 
In this setting some elements of the set 
c  may not belong to the feasible set of the 
primal problem. 
The proposed method is not just a way to reduce the feasible set of the primal 
problem to a subset containing the optimal points. The trivial possibility to achieve 
that would be to reduce generator internal feasible sets to some small subsets, 
containing those points. However, the resulting set of feasible outputs would not 
contain all possible outputs generator may explore staying within technological and 
economic limits. 
To indicate in dual problem that infinitesimal deviations of price from a given 
value may results in under/oversupply of power and ensure nonconfiscatory pricing, 
we enlarge each set ci  to include small neighborhoods of each output volume in the 
“ON” state of the unit, compatible with internal constraints of the generator, and a 
point representing an “OFF” state of the unit. That algorithm results in )(
~
iiG   as 
generator feasible sets in decentralized dispatch problems. For the power system 
under consideration the sets ci  and )(
~
iiG   can be constructed explicitly. 
The proposed modified convex hull pricing approach results in total uplift 
payment lower than (or equal) that in case of convex hull pricing method. We also 
show that in case of convex centralized dispatch problem the proposed pricing 
algorithm produces the same prices as convex hull pricing method - marginal prices. 
Analysis in section IV entails that compared to convex hull pricing method 
only LNMGUs, i.e. units with maximal capacity above demand and cost functions 
exhibiting natural monopoly behavior up to some output volume exceeding demand, 
require special treatment in decentralized dispatch problems emerging in dual of the 
modified primal problem and the rest of generating units can be considered without 
any modifications, i.e. generator decentralized dispatch problems for all other units 
can be formulated as in convex hull pricing method using feasible sets defined by 
generator internal constraints. Hence, if power system has no LNMGU, then proposed 
method gives the same set of prices as convex hull pricing procedure. That 
observation, however, heavily relies on the assumption of zero generator minimal 
capacity limits. 
We showed that )(
~
P , a set of market prices produced by proposed pricing 
method, has well-defined limit as 0 . Also, the new approach gives set of market 
23 
 
prices )0(
~
P  which tends to be “no lower” than set of prices obtained from the 
convex hull pricing. 
Contrary to market price resulting from convex hull pricing, the proposed 
method yields prices which in general case are not monotonically increasing functions 
of load, - that is a trade-off for having lower total uplift payment. 
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